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Introduction
Does inequality cause in ‡ation? Is in ‡ation bad for inequality? What are the links between in ‡ation, inequality, and monetary policy? This paper o¤ers a model for the joint determination of output, interest rate, in ‡ation, and inequality that weaves together these classical questions studied by the empirical literature. 1 We incorporate inequality by introducing two types of agents with di¤erent productivities, wages, and …nancial market accesses. While some households can hold assets and smooth consumption over time, others cannot hold assets and thus cannot react to interest rate changes. In this context, inequality, evaluated through an index built on the consumption of the two types of agents, becomes a straightforward channel between monetary policy and in ‡ation. In choosing a consumption based inequality index, we move beyond income as an indicator of well-being, in line with Krueger and Perri (2006) . 2 Our model contrasts with the current theoretical literature for explicitly incorporating inequality in the structural equations of an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework. Besides a slope-modi…ed intertemporal IS curve we derive both an intertemporal inequality curve and an "inequality augmented" Phillips curve.
Inequality is also present in the welfare-based loss function of the monetary authority. Under this "inequality expanded" objective, an optimal monetary policy can no longer simultaneously stabilize the output gap and in ‡ation since it has to take the e¤ects of inequality into consideration, even when inequality has no impact on in ‡ation.
We also calibrate the model with standard parameters values to show that the optimal policy implies that the variance of interest rate decreases with …nancial exclusion, although the welfare loss increases. This is a new explanation to why observed interest rate paths are much less volatile than optimal policies implied by most existing macroeconomic frameworks, as pointed out by Clarida et al. (1999) .
Finally, we explore the e¤ects of policy shocks on the economy under an optimal 1 Next section brie ‡y presents the empirical literature. 2 The authors argue that current income may not be the appropriate measure of lifetime resources available to agents since a signi…cant fraction of variations of income are due to variations in its transitory component. commitment policy for di¤erent degrees of …nancial exclusion. After a monetary shock, higher levels of …nancial exclusion are associated to higher inequality and lower output gap, in ‡ation, and the interest rate. After a …scal shock, in ‡ation and inequality drop with …nancial exclusion, while the output gap and interest rate increase.
The next section brie ‡y describes the literature that links monetary policy, in‡ation and inequality. Section 3 introduces the model while section 4 presents its log-linear version. Section 5 deals with analyzes of the optimal monetary policy.
Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 Brief literature review
Empirical evidence
On the one hand, there is extensive empirical literature about the in ‡uence of in ‡a-tion and monetary policy on inequality. For example, both Romer and Romer (1999) and Easterly and Fischer (2001) point out that in ‡ation hurts the poor. While the former …nds a strong positive relation between in ‡ation and inequality, the latter …nds that direct measures of improvement in the well-being of the poor and in ‡ation are negatively correlated in pooled cross-country regressions. They also present, using household level polling data for 38 countries, that the poor rather than the rich are more likely to mention in ‡ation as a top national concern.
On the other hand, few empirical studies focus on the in ‡uence of inequality on in ‡ation. For instance, Al-Marhubi (1997) performs OLS regressions of mean in ‡ation on income inequality and …nds that countries with greater inequality have higher mean in ‡ation, even after accounting for the level of openness, political instability, and central bank independence. Dolmas et al. (2000) also run OLS regressions and document a positive correlation between income inequality and in ‡ation in democracies, in contrast to what occurs in non-democracies.
New Keynesian literature
On the theoretical side, most of the work on monetary policy is based on a framework that assumes the existence of a representative household, which is clearly inadequate to evaluate inequality. 3 In the next section we explicitly incorporate inequality in the structural equations of the New Keynesian textbook model in order to provide uni…ed treatment for the mutual in ‡uence between in ‡ation and inequality presented by the empirical literature. Our model contrasts with the current theoretical literature for incorporating di¤erent productivities and wages as two other sources of inequality between consumers apart from …nancial market access. This modi…cation a¤ects the structural equations of the model, the monetary policy objective and introduces a dynamic inequality curve.
The model
The economy consists of households, …rms, and the government. We use a modi…ed version of the model presented in Galí et al. (2004) to analyze the e¤ects of inequality on monetary policy. We read their rule-of-thumb consumers as agents excluded from the …nancial market. On the one hand, we simplify their model by ignoring investment, as in Bilbiie (2005) . On the other hand, we incorporate di¤er-ent productivities and wages as two other sources of inequality between consumers apart from …nancial market access. We intend to account for inequality e¤ects while keeping the model as close as possible to the standard New Keynesian framework.
We explicitly assume that money only plays the role of a unit of account. Money does not appear in either the budget constraint or utility function. Throughout, we specify monetary policy in terms of an interest rate rule; hence, we do not need to introduce money explicitly in the model.
Households
We assume a continuum of in…nitely-lived households indexed in the unit interval.
An exogenous fraction 2 (0; 1) of households -so forth called …nancially excluded (FE) agents -do not own any assets. The remaining fraction 1 of householdsthe …nancially included (FI) agents -has access to …nancial markets. We use letters "e"and "i"to index variables associated to FE and FI consumers.
The preference at period 0 of the type k representative household is represented by:
where 0 < < 1 denotes the discount factor, C k t is an index of consumption goods and H k t is the number of hours worked at period t. 4 Type k households o¤er labor in a perfectly competitive market with fully ‡exible wages. They also purchase di¤erentiated goods in a retail market and combine them into a composite good using a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator:
where C k t (z) is the demand for di¤erentiated goods of type z. Type k household minimizes the total cost of obtaining di¤erentiated goods indexed by a unit interval [0; 1], taking as given their nominal prices P t (z). Cost-minimization then gives a demand curve of the form:
where the aggregate price level P t is de…ned to be
Financially included consumer
In each period t = 0, 1, 2,:::, the FI household chooses decision rules for consumption C i t , labor H i t , and nominal bonds portfolio B t+1 to maximize (1) subject to a sequence of period budget constraints that must hold with equality in equilibrium:
where Q t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for computing the nominal value at period t of one unit of consumption goods at period t + 1, W i t is the nominal wage rate for FI households, i t denotes nominal dividend income, and T i t represents the nominal value of (net) lump-sum taxes.
The following …rst order conditions must hold in equilibrium with a positive risk-free nominal rate of interest at period t, i t :
regarding the fact that E t fQ t;t+1 g = (1 + i t ) 1 .
Financially excluded consumer
Households from this group are excluded from …nancial markets and consequently cannot hold assets. Thereafter, FE consumer maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraint:
where W e t is the nominal wage rate for FE households. People excluded from the …nancial system are also unable to buy stocks and receive di¤erentiated treatment from the government. As a result, only FI consumers receive dividends and pay lump-sum taxes.
As equation (6) holds with equality in equilibrium, FE agents just consume their current labor income. The associated …rst order condition is analogous to (5):
which combined with (6) yields
Firms
Monopolistically competitive …rms indexed in the unit interval characterize the goods market. Each …rm z produces a di¤erentiated good z using Cobb-Douglas technology:
where Y t (z) denotes the level of output at period t of …rm z while H e t (z) and H i t (z) are the total number of working hours hired from each type of agent by this …rm.
The variable A t > 0 is an exogenous technology factor while q 2 (0; 1) and 1 q are the productivity factors associated with each type of agent.
Market clearing imposes
, where G t (z) represents governmental demand for the good produced by …rm z. We assume that government purchases an aggregate G t of form (2) of all goods in the economy, and thus the government's demand for each good z is given by a demand curve analogous to (3). Thereafter, we obtain the following demand curve for each good z:
where
is a composite index analogous to those speci…ed in (2) that denotes aggregate demand.
Since the minimum cost criterion is given by W e of agent:
where ( i ; q i ) = (1 ; q), ( e ; q e ) = ( ; q 1), and
dz is a dispersion measure for prices.
Under these assumptions, all …rms face the same nominal marginal costs M C n t
given by
The marginal cost does not depend on the output level of an individual …rm, as long as its production function exhibits constant returns to scale and input prices are fully ‡exible in perfectly competitive markets.
Flexible-price equilibrium
Under ‡exible prices, the optimal pricing decision for any …rm z takes the traditional form
where = 1 > 1 is the desired markup of the …rm. The subsidy for output 0 < 1 o¤sets the e¤ect on imperfect competition in the goods markets on the steady state level of output. 5 We combine (12) with (5) and (7) to write the following expression for the real marginal cost:
where factor
is a function of t , de…ned as the FE agents'share of total consumption
Finally, we combine equations (13) and (14) to show that relative prices depend on the distribution of consumption characterized by t :
We use an alternative de…nition of potential output in order to make our work more directly comparable with the existing literature. Thereafter, potential output,
Inequality decreases the potential output Y Denoting steady state values with an over bar, equation (16) reduces to
where A = 1 and C = Y . 6 Expressed in terms of percentage deviations around the steady state, the equal consumption ‡exible-price equilibrium output level is given
which is the same expression for the natural rate of output in the standard New Keynesian framework, beingẑ t (z t z) = z for all variables z t , except forĜ t G t = Y .
Dynamic equilibrium
We derive the log-linear version of the model around a steady state with zero in ‡a-tion, equal consumption for all agents, and without government spending
to analyze the transition dynamics. In order to allow for real e¤ects of monetary policy, …rms set prices as in the sticky price model of Calvo (1983) . Speci…cally, during each period a fraction of …rms are not allowed to change prices, whereas the other fraction, 1 , do change.
IS curve
The demand side of the model is represented by an intertemporal IS equation. The log-linear version of (4) iŝ
where t is the in ‡ation rate. Analogously, we use equations (8) and (11) to obtain:
where we write W e t =W i t in terms of t . 7 Finally, the log-linearization of (15) yields:
De…ning x t Ŷ t Ŷ f t as our output gap measure and using equations (18) to (20), we obtain the following IS curve:
7 From equations (5) and (7), we have C where '
. The real interest rate that stabilizes the output gap, r f t , called the natural rate of interest, evolves according to:
As in Bilbiie (2005) , our model predicts that when …nancial exclusion change from high to low the slope of the IS curve changes from positive ("non-Keynesian") to negative. Note, however, that also varies with q. If > 1, the impact of the interest rate on the output gap is more intense than in the standard New Keynesian model. We show in panel (A) of …gure 1 that, considering only Keynesian values, increases with .
Inequality evolution
We combine equations (19) and (20) to write^ t as a function of x t :
where q 1
. We choose the Gini index for consumption, given by g t = ^ t , as the inequality variable of our economy. 8 The evolution of the Gini index, obtained from the substitution of (22) in the IS curve and the replacement of^ t for g t , gives us an intuitive way of seeing how monetary policy a¤ects inequality:
( 1) and r t , the real interest rate that stabilizes g t , is de…ned as
8 Normalizing C t to unity (or 100 percent of consumption) and imposing that C e t < C i t , we obtain g t = ^ t . If C e t > C i t , we …nd that g t = ^ t . Thereafter, the Gini index is given by ^ t , which assumes only positive values as a measure. In this context, it does not matter for the Gini index that agent consumes more, but only how di¤erent their consumption is. In the present work, we will de…ne g t = ^ t . Although this variable is not a measure, the sign helps to identify which agents are increasing their consumption. "Inequality increases" means that FE agents are reducing their consumption.
If > 1, inequality rises with the interest rate. The di¤erence between the real interest rates that stabilize the output gap and the Gini index is solely based on the evolution of government spending. Panel (A) of …gure 1 shows that increases with , being always smaller than .
New Keynesian Phillips curve
The Calvo (1983) model leads to an aggregate supply relation of the form:
where (1 ) (1 ) = > 0 and d M C t is the percent variation of real marginal costs.
Considering (17), a log-linearization of the real marginal costs expressed in (14) yields:
The …rst component is standard but now with a di¤erent interpretation. Marginal costs are proportional to the output gap that would occur if consumption of both agents were equal. The second term corrects this measure by the inequality e¤ect. We can use this equation and (24) to obtain our New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC)
where (! + ) and = .
From (22) and (25) the NKPC can be written in a more familiar format
where 1 1+
and the shock u t is given by
Equation (23), which shows how monetary policy a¤ects inequality, together with equation (25), the inequality augmented NKPC, lead to our …rst result:
Conclusion 1 (Inequality channel) There is a channel from interest rate to in‡ation throughout inequality when 6 = q. If there is an excess of unquali…ed people ( > q), in ‡ation rises with inequality > 0 . Besides, the inequalityin ‡ation trade-o¤ decreases with …nancial exclusion ( ). Alternatively, if > q, the output-in ‡ation trade-o¤ is higher than in the standard New Keynesian model ( < ). In addition, a shock u t arises as a function of the share of government spending that impacts the real interest rate that stabilizes inequality r t but not the natural rate of interest r f t .
Optimal monetary policy
The policymaker maximizes the average expected utility of households. Following
Erceg et al. (2000) and Woodford (2003b) , we obtain our policy objective function by taking a second-order approximation to the aggregate utility of all agents given by:
where U e 0 and U i 0 are de…ned in (1). This procedure yields
where tip denotes terms independent of the actual policy such as constants and terms involving only exogenous variables while L t is given by:
where x , and are functions of the structural parameters of the model and x + + = 1. 9 Thereafter, we have: 9 Speci…cally, x ; ; ; with + + and h
Conclusion 2 (Inequality objective)
The objective of a monetary policy consistent with welfare maximization includes inequality stabilization (g 2 t ), as well as in ‡ation and output gap stabilization ^ The maximization of (27) subject to the constraints represented by the NKPC in (25) and the equation that governs the dynamics of g t in (22) generates the following criterion under commitment:
This so-called optimal target criterion represents a policy rule that is optimal from a timeless perspective following Giannoni and Woodford (2005) . In ‡ation should be accepted as long as it is negatively proportional to output gap variations corrected by inequality variations over the same period.
It is not optimal to maintain zero in ‡ation and a zero output gap in the face of inequality variations. If > q, the coe¢ cient on x t in …rst order condition
1 is greater than standard value 1 . In this context, optimal policy results in greater in ‡ation variability for a given level of output gap variability when inequality is present.
Intuitively, stabilizing in ‡ation has become more costly when > q. As{ t increases, x t decreases, and this serves to reduce in ‡ation, but the direct e¤ect in g t of the rise in the nominal interest rate partly o¤sets the de ‡ationary impact of a tighter monetary policy. Because it is more costly (in terms of the output gap) to control in ‡ation, equilibrium in ‡ation variability will be higher.
In order to implement the target rule, we obtain an optimal instrument rule by substituting equations (21), (23) , and (25) in the optimal criterion (29):
where the 0 j s are functions of the structural parameters of the model while composite shock t is de…ned according to
which is the weight average between the natural rate of interest and the real interest rate that stabilizes g t . 10 We call equation (30) our expectations-based reaction function following Evans and Honkapohja (2006) . If the monetary authority commits itself to set interest rates in accordance with this reaction function at all times, then the rational-expectations equilibrium is necessarily determinate. Since we intend to keep the model as close as possible to the standard New Keynesian framework, we will not consider calibrations that generates "non-Keynesian" e¤ects, e.g. a IS curve with a positive slope or a inverted Taylor principle.
We set = 0:9 in order to obtain in our baseline case ( = q) the value of 10 The coe¢ cients are 1 + , Figure 1 presents the evolution of the main composite parameters of the model.
Welfare analysis
Taking the unconditional expectation of (27) to abstract from initial conditions, we obtain the welfare as a function of weighted variances:
where, for any variable z t , we have the weight z z , and where the measure of variability is de…ned by 
which, except for discounting, corresponds to the unconditional variance of z t . We include in the calculation ofÊ [L 0 ] to analyze how welfare evolves with . It is important to remember that x , and have been normalized to sum one. Therefore, the graph in panel (D) of …gure 1 describes how in ‡ation becomes relatively more important as grows. Without this normalization, , and x do not vary with , in contrast to that decreases. 13 Under the optimal plan, higher levels of …nancial exclusion are associated to bigger welfare losses. The impact of the interest rate on inequality, , and output gap, , increases with . See panel (A) of …gure 1. At the same time, in ‡ation stabilization becomes more costly, since nominal interest rate generates opposite impacts on g t and x t . As a result, the equilibrium variability of t , x t , and g t is 13 Under our baseline calibration, = 11 and x = 0:2963. The value of 1 when = 0:4 and ! 1 when ! 0. higher.
Note, however, that interest rate variability decreases with …nancial exclusion.
This leads to our …nal result:
Conclusion 3 (E¢ cient frontier) An e¢ cient frontier emerges from the fact that welfare loss and interest rate variability evolve in opposite ways with …nancial exclusion under the optimal plan. Figure 2 presents the e¢ cient frontier.
In our model, interest rate volatility is avoided because of its direct impact on inequality, which increases with . This is a new explanation to why observed interest rate paths are much less volatile than optimal policies implied by most existing The introduction of an inequality channel does not a¤ect the basic response pattern. For all values of , a monetary shock contracts the output gap and increases inequality, as measured by the Gini index ^ t , since interest rates rise above both their natural rate r f t and the natural rate of inequality r t . These movements generate opposite impacts on in ‡ation. Nevertheless, since persistently negative future output gaps compensate for in ‡ationary pressure generated by the increase in inequality, in ‡ation falls. As increases, all these dynamics are ampli…ed, the initial responses of the output gap and in ‡ation are lower, and the Gini response is higher. Since the optimal interest rule considers inequality, the nominal interest rate rises less under this policy.
From the point of view of the agents' decisions, FI agents postpone their con- sumption in response to an interest rate increase induced by the monetary shock.
Market clearing forces …rms to reduce their production and, consequently, the demand for labor and wages paid for both agents. Since FE agents direct all their current labor income to consumption, any reduction in wages and working hours will drive them to reduce their consumption as well.
When > 1, FE consumption and wages, expressed in terms of percentage deviations around the steady state, are more volatile than FI consumption and wages, while the opposite is true regarding hours. It happens because FE consumers are less susceptible to cuts in their wages since they only consume if they work. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of the four endogenous variables to a …scal shock under an optimal commitment policy. The di¤erent lines are indexed by .
Fiscal shocks
Under a …scal shock, r f t 6 = r t . As a result, the central bank becomes unable to stabilize inequality and output gap with just one instrument -the interest rate.
Since both variables impact in ‡ation, maintaining a zero output gap is not enough to keep in ‡ation at zero. Even when inequality has no in ‡uence on in ‡ation ( = q), the optimal policy that reduces ‡uctuations in welfare allows both in ‡ation and the output gap to deviate from zero. When > q the presence of the Gini index on the Phillips curve a¤ects in ‡ation similarly to the introduction of a cost channel as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006) . This dynamics contrasts with the one presented by the standard textbook New Keynesian model, when monetary authorities face no trade-o¤ between stabilizing in ‡ation and output gap, being able to perfectly o¤set the impact of a …scal shock.
As …gure 4 shows, the monetary authority responds to a …scal shock with an increase in the interest rate. As the interest rate rises less than r t , inequality drops.
The impact on the output gap depends on the value of . For bigger values of , the rise in r f t more than compensates for monetary tightening, increasing the output gap, while the opposite occurs for small values of . The in ‡ation dynamics is initially dominated by the Gini index, while the in ‡uence of the output gap is noticeable on the overshooting that occurs.
After the …scal shock, the resulting interest rate increase induces FI agents to postpone their consumption. However, government spending more than compensates for this decline in consumption, forcing …rms to increase their production and, consequently, the demand for labor. Nevertheless, as FI agents are not so anxious for consumption, they are willing to accept smaller wages for the same amount of work. Thereafter, their real wages fall, even with an increase in working hours. On the other hand, FE agents do not respond to the resulting interest rate increase and thereby require higher real wages to work more. Since FE agents direct all their current labor income to consumption, any increase in wages and working hours will drive them to increase their consumption as well.
Conclusions
We have incorporated inequality into the standard New Keynesian framework by introducing two types of agents with di¤erent productivities, wages, and …nancial market accesses. In our model, inequality, evaluated through an index built on the consumption of the two types of agents, a¤ects both structural equations and the monetary policy objective.
We show that monetary policy in ‡uences both output gap and inequality, which in turn a¤ect in ‡ation. Furthermore, we derive a welfare-based loss function for the monetary authority that encompasses not only in ‡ation and output gap but also inequality variations.
We also show that welfare losses and interest rate variability under the optimal plan evolve in opposite directions with …nancial exclusion. Finally, we show how di¤erent levels of …nancial exclusion a¤ect both welfare and the dynamic responses of the model after …scal and monetary shocks.
As part of future research associated with the present paper, we plan to conduct a quantitative analysis of the joint evolution of nominal interest rates and inequality in several countries. Finally, it would also be relevant to explore how social plans, such as investments in education or minimum-wage policies, a¤ect both inequality and the monetary policy. Nevertheless, additional investigation into this "socialmacro dynamics" requires a uni…ed theoretical framework that encompasses both social and economic policies. This model is just a …rst step in this direction. 
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